Lecture references
The Hard Problem of Consciousness
These references support the CIRI Listen & Learn lecture and link to source pages, abstracts, or publicly available versions when available.
Chalmers, D. J. (1995). Facing up to the problem of consciousness.
Citation: Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2(3), 200–219.
Introduces the easy-problems versus hard-problem distinction that anchors the lecture.
Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat?
Citation: The Philosophical Review, 83(4), 435–450.
Frames consciousness around subjective experience and the first-person character of awareness.
Jackson, F. (1982). Epiphenomenal qualia.
Citation: The Philosophical Quarterly, 32(127), 127–136.
Presents the Mary thought experiment and the knowledge argument about qualitative experience.
Levine, J. (1983). Materialism and qualia: the explanatory gap.
Citation: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 64(4), 354–361.
Introduces the explanatory gap between physical accounts and felt experience.
Dennett, D. C. (1988). Quining qualia.
Citation: In A. J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (Eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press.
A major skeptical challenge to traditional qualia arguments and private inner-object accounts of experience.
Churchland, P. M. (1981). Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes.
Citation: The Journal of Philosophy, 78(2), 67–90.
A foundational eliminative-materialist paper relevant to skeptical responses to folk-psychological categories.
Churchland, P. S. (1986). Neurophilosophy: toward a unified science of the mind-brain.
Citation: MIT Press.
A major neurophilosophical work arguing for close alignment between philosophy of mind and empirical neuroscience.