Lecture references
Awareness, Attention, and Self-Awareness
These references support the CIRI Listen & Learn lecture and link to source pages, abstracts, or publicly available versions when available.
Block, N. (1995). On a confusion about a function of consciousness.
Citation: Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18(2), 227–287.
Provides the phenomenal-consciousness versus access-consciousness distinction used to separate experience from reportability and cognitive availability.
Dehaene et al. (2006). Conscious, preconscious, and subliminal processing: a testable taxonomy.
Citation: Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10(5), 204–211.
Supports careful distinctions among conscious access, preconscious processing, and subliminal processing.
Koch and Tsuchiya (2007). Attention and consciousness: two distinct brain processes.
Citation: Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11(1), 16–22.
A central reference for explaining why attention and consciousness should be distinguished even though they interact closely.
Posner and Petersen (1990). The attention system of the human brain.
Citation: Annual Review of Neuroscience, 13, 25–42.
A foundational review of attention networks and control systems in the human brain.
Treisman and Gelade (1980). A feature-integration theory of attention.
Citation: Cognitive Psychology, 12(1), 97–136.
A landmark attention paper relevant to feature selection, perceptual organization, and binding.
Simons and Chabris (1999). Gorillas in our midst.
Citation: Perception, 28(9), 1059–1074.
The classic inattentional blindness study showing how focused attention can shape conscious notice.
Cowan (2001). The magical number 4 in short-term memory.
Citation: Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24(1), 87–114.
Useful for distinguishing attention and working memory while explaining how selected information is kept active for use.
Gallagher (2000). Philosophical conceptions of the self.
Citation: Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4(1), 14–21.
Clarifies different levels of selfhood relevant to self-awareness and cognitive science.
Blanke and Metzinger (2009). Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood.
Citation: Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 13(1), 7–13.
Addresses body ownership, self-location, and minimal phenomenal selfhood, supporting the lecture’s discussion of bodily self-awareness.